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Executive summary
Objective
In recent years the increase in the availability of frequencies and the use of new
technology have been accompanied by an increase in the number of television services
whose signal is encrypted with a view to restricting reception to subscribers. In order
to receive the programmes, viewers must have a decoding device that can reconstitute
the original picture.
The market is experiencing rapid growth particularly as a result of the advent of digital
technology, which permits an expansion in the capacity for communication. These
television services will increasingly be compelled to adopt a transnational and often
even European dimension due to their specialised nature. However, growth is being
jeopardized by piracy: a flourishing unofficial decoder manufacturing industry is
emerging  in parallel to that of authorised manufacturers. Devices enabling access to a
service without payment of the subscription or fee are produced and marketed without
the permission of service operators.  This results in considerable losses for the service
provider and indirectly adversely affects the potential market of programme suppliers
and official manufacturers.
In the light of these developments, the Commission already emphasised the need for effective
protection of coded signals against their illegal reception in its Strategic Programme for the Internal
Market of 22 December 1993 (COM(93)632 final).
Such a requirement is all the more urgent in the run-up to the Information Society: as
more and more encrypted services become available in the future, measures will need to
be adopted to ensure the protection of these services, whatever their content, against illicit reception.
Accordingly, in its Communication of July 1994 entitlted "Europe's Way to the Information Society:
An Action Plan" (COM(94) 347) the Commission announced the preparation of a Green Paper on
the Legal Protection of Encrypted Services in the Internal Market with the aim of examining
problems raised both by the absence of specific legislation on the legal protection of encrypted
services in some Member States and by disparaties between existing legislation in others.
The current regulatory environment
A comparison of the regulatory methods chosen by legislators in the Member States
reveals appreciable differences in the approach to the problem of illicit reception of
encrypted services.
Whereas some Member States adopted  specific legislation ensuring protection against the illegal
reception of encrypted services in the late 1980s, others ( A, P, E, GR, DK, D and LUX) have no
such legislation to date.
The general rules (e.g. on unfair competition, telecommunications and copyright)
sometimes applied in Member States belonging to the second group are often unable
to provide effective protection against the illegal reception of encrypted services. This
has allowed the development, in some of those Member States, of a flourishing
industry that manufactures, markets, installs and maintains pirate devices. A specialist3
press has also developed, providing targeted publications and commercial promotion
networks for pirate decoders. The repercussions of this situation extend to other
Member States, where such devices are introduced on to the market in spite of
restrictive measures.
Among the Member States which have adopted specific legislation, the differences
between the solutions adopted are substantial, in particular as regards scope, the
activities prohibited  (commercial promotion, private possession) and the level of
sanctions.
Need for Community action
In view of this situation, Community action could well be justified. The fact that the
Member States do not all have an equivalent level of legal protection prevents the
Internal Market from operating correctly. This creates a number of obstacles to the
free movement of encrypted services and decoders and numerous distortions of
competition between operators in the various Member States.  The present differences
between the regulatory solutions and the resulting extra costs and legal uncertainty are
viewed by the profession as a major barrier to the development of a European market
of new encrypted services.
Such an initiative would also be useful in preparation for the Information Society, in
which encrypted services could be called upon to play a major role. It would also
eliminate the fragmentation of the Internal Market and would simultaneously take
other existing Community objectives into account such as those persued by the
industrial, audiovisual, cultural  and consumer protection policies  
Operators have overwhelmingly expressed support for a Community measure. In this
regard, the DVB (European Digital Video Broadcasting Group) has adopted a
recommendation emphasizing the need for a clear and uniform EU-wide regulatory
framework. This view was shared by the European Parliament, which proposed
inserting in the Directive on the Use of Standards for the Transmission of Television
Signals a recital underlining the need to introduce and apply efficient anti-piracy
legislation at European level; the Directive, along with the recital, was adopted by the
Council on 24 October 1995.
Before proposing an initiative, however, the Commission would like to consult
interested parties on the course of action described below.
The Commission could propose an initiative harmonizing national legislation. Taking
into account the principle of proportionality and subsidiarity, the proposed initiative
could provide for minimum harmonisation, leaving Member States free to adopt
stricter principles while ensuring a minimum level of equivalent protection within the
Union. The proposed initiative could thus prohibit the production, sale, possession for
either commercial or personal use, installation and commercial promotion of decoders
designed to enable access to encrypted services without the encryptor's authorisation.
Such a course of action would both ensure EU-wide equivalent protection against
illicit access to encrypted services and afford legal certainty to the interests concerned.4
Next step
The Commission is keen to ensure that the Green Paper is the subject of open
consultations: any person, firm, body or authority is free to take part. This will be a
twin-track consultation process, in that it is addressed not just to trade associations and
federations but also to individual operators. The Green Paper will be sent to the
European Parliament, to the Economic and Social Committee, to the Committee of the
Regions, to the Member States, to the European Economic Area and to the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe.
The time-limit for submitting comments is 31 May 1996. In the summer of 1996 the
Commission will, in the light of the comments received, decide whether an initiative at
Community level is called for.5
Introduction
I. The problem of illicit reception
The use of signal encryption in broadcasting has been on the increase in recent years.
In the 1980s systems characterised by varying degrees of security began to appear
employing a form of scrambling in which the standard picture and/or sound signals are
altered before transmission in such a way that a normal receiver cannot reconstitute
the original programme.  In order to recover the original picture the viewer needed a
special decoding device (decoder, smart card or computer programme-normally issued
on the payment of a subscription fee) which could interpret the instructions
accompanying the encrypted signal.
Originally used by cable companies to modulate the number of channels available to
the viewer under the terms of his subscription agreement, the technology rapidly
spread to terrestrial pay-television stations and evolved dramatically with the satellite
broadcasting of encrypted channels.  The use of encryption will, however, increase
sharply with the advent of digital technology and the development of Information
Society services (such as interactive teleshopping, tele-information services, on-line
professional services and interactive games) since they will all, in varying degrees,
need to rely on encryption to ensure their viable development.
Encryption is used for a variety of reasons: on top of commercial strategy
requirements, i.e. the need to find fresh sources of revenue, copyright holders can
require to use encryption to protect and exploit the covered programmes.  The
protection of minors, particularly in the case of adult channels, as well as the improved
identification of the audience to allow for targeted maketing, can also be major factors.
A flourishing unauthorised manufacturing industry has, however, sprung up alongside
that of official producers of decoding devices. This pirate industry manufactures and
markets decoding devices enabling illicit reception of the service without the service
provider's authorisation , usually at prices below those of official devices.
It is estimated that unauthorised devices currently represent about 5 to 20% of the total
number of devices in circulation and generate turnover of several million Ecus
annually. Moreover, a specialised press developed around this pirate market,
providing targeted publications and thus also a medium for the marketing of
unauthorised devices.  An after-sales service market also developed, providing
maintenance and even sometimes the replacement of the device in the event that the
operator would change system.
The sale of these unauthorised devices has, first of all, an adverse effect on the
operators of encrypted services.  As well as suffering losses in terms of potential
market and profits, they bear additional costs as a result of having to adopt expensive
distribution systems for their decoder devices (which are usually rented out) in order
to control their use.
For the suppliers of the programmes contained in the broadcasts , the marketing of the unauthorised
devices represents a loss of profits, as in the negotiations concerning the price payable for the rights,6
no account will have been taken of the individuals who receive the programmes via an unauthorised
device.
For those supplying the technology, the marketing of unauthorised devices undermines
confidence in their system and results in lost profits connected with the potential
market taken over by such equipment.
For the consumers, the marketing of the unauthorised devices constitutes a risk as they
could be mislead about the origin of the decoding device they are purchasing and thus
believe they are buying authorised device, whereas it is in fact a pirated decoder.  In
this case, if the operator modifies the encryption system for security reasons, the
device purchased would be of no use to the consumer, who would have to pay for
another decoder.  Moreover, the service providers pass on the losses they suffer from
piracy onto the price of, or rental charges for, authorised devices made available to
consumers.
II. The Regulatory Environment
In order to redress this problem, operators have asked that Member States adopt
specific rules providing rapid and effective legal protection against the manufacture
and distribution of unauthorised decoding devices. While technological progress has
improved the security of encryption systems, purely technological solutions have often
proved ineffective. When choosing an encryption system the operator is faced with a
trade-off between the cost of the system and the level of security it provides.
Experience has moreover shown that piracy techniques have developed at the same
rate as encryption techniques and that there is no guarantee that new systems using
digital technology will not come under attack. It was therefore felt that, in order to
deal with pirates, technology had to be supplemented by legislation. However, the
resulting wave of regulatory change among Member States, which has not as yet been
completed, reveals a substantial difference in approach.1
In this context, in its July 1994 Communication entitled "Europe's way to the
Information Society. An Action Plan" (COM(94) 347), the Commission announced
the preparation of a "Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Encrypted Services in
the Internal Market" aimed at analysing the problems raised both by the absence of
specific legislation on illicit reception of encrypted services in some Member States
and by disparities between existing legislation in others.
III. Services covered
The subject of the following analysis is the illicit reception of an encrypted service,
i.e. reception without payment and/or authorisation,by persons who are not authorised
by the service providers, and the solutions that have been found to this problem by
national regulations.  "Encrypted services" is defined for the purposes of this Paper as
services whose signal is encrypted in order to ensure payment of a fee. This category
includes traditional encrypted broadcasts (via a cable, hertzian waves or by satellite),
the new broadcasting services (digital television, pay-per-view, near video on
                    
1 See Chapter 3:  Member States' legislation.7
demand) and Information Society services, namely electronic distance services
provided on individual request of a service user (in particular video on demand, games
supplied on request, teleshopping and multimedia information services ).
Services encrypted for reasons other than ensuring the payment of a fee, i.e. those
encrypted in order to guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of the message
transmitted, namely financial or telecommunications services (in particular mobile
telephone services using GSM technology) are not covered. This exclusion is based on
the fact that the general interests involved in the event of interception of these services
(i.e. the integrity and confidentiality of the communication) differ appreciably from
the general-interest objective (i.e. the protection of the value of a service provides
against payment) threatened by the illicit reception of encrypted services as defined
for the purpuse of this Paper.  As this difference has led to appreciably different
solutions in terms of legislation both at national and international level particularly as
regards action and the level of sanctions, the joint treatment of both problems is not
justified.
Moreover, the Green Paper does not cover questions concerning systems designed to
prevent the copying of a work or other protected subject matter. These have been
addressed in the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society adopted by the Commission in July 1995.
Lastly, this Green Paper does not deal with questions relating to the standardization of
conditional access systems, or with the conditions under which licences are granted
for such systems, since they are already covered by the Directive on the Use of
Standards for the Transmission of Television Signals,2  or with the control by national
authorities of coding systems.  The latter question, which is closely linked to the the
problem of security, is currently being studied by the Commission in the context of its
work on the security of information systems. Other studies could furthermore be
launched at a future date if the efficient operation of the Internal Market would be
threatened or jeopardized by the implementation of national rules.
IV. Preparatory work
In preparation for the Green Paper, the Commission asked three independent firms to
examine the technological, economic and legal aspects of the market in encrypted
services.3
                    
2 Directive 95/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Use
of Standards for the Transmission of Television Signals (OJ No L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 51).
3 Copies of their findings are obtainable from:
European Commission,
Directorate-General for the Internal Market and Financial Services,
The Media, Commercial Communication and Unfair Competition, 
DG XV/E/5
C 107 8/59
200 rue de la Loi
B 1049 Brussels
Belgium
Fax: (32-2) 295 77 12
Email: e5@dg15.cec.be8
The first study, "Technical aspects related to encrypted broadcasts" concentrated on
the economic and technical aspects of the subject and dealt in particular with currently
used encryption systems, their advantages and disadvantages and their vulnerability to
pirate activities.  As regards the economic aspect, the study focused on the cost of the
managment of a subscribtion system for encrypted services, on the trend towards the
development of compatible decoding systems and on the advent of the new digital
technologies.
The second study, "Protection of encrypted broadcasts" concerned  the legal aspects
of the issue. It analysed the factors which influenced the development of encrypted
services,  the reasons for piracy and the legal solutions adopted to combat it.
The third study, "Legal protection of encrypted broadcasting signals" examined the
legislation of the Member States on the protection of encrypted broadcasts, application
of these laws by national courts and, where relevant, the established controls and
sanctions.  The Institute also analysed the regulations adopted by international bodies
(Council of Europe, WIPO).
In addition, in March 1995, the Commission initiated a wide-ranging process of
consultation with the relevant sectors of industry concerned with the problem of illicit
reception of encrypted services, particularly broadcasters, manufacturers of decoding
devices, cable operators, programme providers, telecommunication companies and
other interested parties who had expressed a desire to be involved.
The consultation confirmed that illicit reception of encrypted services and
fragmentation of the legal framework at the level of the EU pose a real problem for the
media industry. It believes that the possibility of benefiting from effective legal
protection against illicit reception is an important factor when deciding on the
distribution of a new encrypted service in a particular Member State. In the absence of
such protection, operators often prefer not to market the service.
Operators thus overwhelmingly expressed support for a Community initiative.
Similarly, in 1995, in the context of the meeting of its group of experts, the DVB
(European Digital Video Broadcasting Group), which is at the forefront of digital
television standards, adopted a recommendation underlining the need for a clear and
uniform EU-wide regulatory framework which can be relied upon in the event of illicit
reception of encrypted services.
That view was shared by the European Parliament, which, in the procedure leading to
the adoption of the Directive on the Use of Standards for the Transmission of
Television Signals4  proposed inserting a recital emphasizing that, in a digital
environment, the scope for piracy in the European audiovisual market will increase,
with negative consequences for both operators and programme providers, and that it is
becoming increasingly necessary to introduce and apply efficient anti-piracy
legislation at European level. The recital was adopted along with the Directive by the
Council on 24 October 1995.
                    
4 Directive 95/47/EC (see above).910
Chapter 1: The European market in encrypted services
1. A buoyant market
The recent past, technological developments (e.g. satellites and fibre optic cables)
have produced rapid changes in the European audiovisual landscape and allowed for a
steady expansion of the supply of services. As more operators have increasingly
engaged in targeted commercial strategies, the encryption of their signals has proved
essential for their viability.
The traditional structure for financing private channels, based exclusively on
advertising income, is often no longer a viable proposition for new entrants. As the
number of broadcasting stations increases, the contribution of income per channel
from traditional television advertisers becomes smaller. Simultaneousley operators
attempt to distinguish themselves from this growing number of potential competitors
by catering to the needs of specific market niches, i.e. by focusing on the tastes and
interests of particular user groups (thematic film, music or sports channels, etc.). An
operator can thus profile himself from his mass market competitors by targeting a
demand that had previously been satisfied only in part or not at all. Comparing
identical geographical areas, however, niche service audiences are invariably more
closely targeted and, by the same token, smaller. Operators of specialised media
cannot, therefore, rely on income from mass market advertisers,5  who express less or
little interest a media strategy that is not aimed a mass audience.
1.1 Reasons for using encryption:
The main reasons for encrypting signals can be summed up as follows:
￿ To ensure the financial contribution of the beneficiaries of the service:  the
concept of niche services is based on the ability to provide added value to
certain categories of users as compared to those aimed at the mass market.
Users can therefore be asked to contribute to the financing of this specialised
service which, as a result of encryption, cannot be received by non-subscribers;
￿ The possibility of increasing advertising revenue per audience unit: by
encrypting the signal, the operator will find it easier to sell advertising space to,
or strike sponsorship deals with, firms interested in the targeted market niche.
Advertisers will therefore be asked to pay for the targeted market only and not
for the entire equivalent geographical market. They will therefore be willing to
pay more per audience unit since the audience will be regarded as being of a
higher quality compared to a mass audience.
￿ The ability to target supply more accurately: increased knowledge of the user
of the service will help the operator to fine-tune his service to the exact
requirements of the target market.
                    
5 In this document, "advertisers" means firms that make use of commercial communication.  This
includes all forms of publicity, commercial promotion, direct marketing, sponsorship and public
relations. This general approach is preferred since it can take into account recent and possible
future changes in the use of marketing tools in the wake of developments in the media field.11
￿ Simplifying the acquisition of broadcasting rights: satellite broadcasting has
considerably increased the potential reception area. Traditionally, however,
broadcasting rights are granted on a territorial basis, which means access often
has to be limited to viewers within a specific geographical or common
language area. Encryption allows the operator to restrict the reception of the
signal exclusively to those territories for which rights have been acquired.
Moreover, as suggested in the "Cable and Satellite" Directive,6  encryption will
enable the use of the actual audience (e.g. the number of subscribers and not
the geographical area) as a basis for the negotiation of satellite broadcasting
and cable retransmission rights, thereby reducing the acquisition cost of
programmes intended for the development of a niche service.
￿ The creation of a new window in the chronology of media distribution:
encryption allows rightholders to add a new window to the pattern of media
distribution;  operators of an encrypted service often carry programming before
it is broadcast to a mass audience and, in order to secure exclusive rights in
respect of those works, they are prepared to pay large sums, thereby creating a
new source of income for the rightsholders.
￿ Regulatory requirements: on grounds of public policy, in particular the
protection of minors (e.g. in the case of broadcasting channels aimed at adult
audiences), the authorities may, as forseen in the Television Without Frontiers
Directive7  (Article 22, second sentence), allow certain services to operate on
condition that they are encrypted so that reception can be limited to specific
groups of viewers.
1.2 Encrypted services
The European market in encrypted services consists mainly of pay-television
channels8 . Initially tranmsitted via cable and hertzian waves, this service especially
expanded when medium powered and high powered satellites were introduced
allowing broadcasts to be received anywhere within the footprint of the satellite using
an individual satellite dish.
The development of technology has, however, enabled more sophisticated pay
broadcasting services to be launched, e.g. pay-per-view broadcasts,9  which must be
                    
6 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the Coordination of Certain Rules
Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and
Cable Retransmission (OJ No L 248, 6.10.1993, p. 15).
7 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of
television broadcasting activities (OJ No L 298, 17.10.1989, p.15).
8 "Pay television" is a term used to define a situation in which a viewer pays to receive a particular
station hertzian, by satellite and/or by cable.
9 In the United States, 35% of the homes that subscribe to cable (i.e. about 20 million) are equipped
with devices enabling them to receive these services. In France, Multivision offers two
pay-per-view services to 220 000 homes.12
paid for before they can be seen by viewers. Pay-per-view is technically possible
without digital compression, but it requires a sophisticated subscription management
system. Pay-per-view could involve the viewer paying to see one particular event (e.g.
a concert or a boxing match) or a series of events (e.g. the right to see ten football
matches). In the latter example the broadcaster cannot presently identify exactly which
events have been viewed by a particular viewer. Technological progress is however
allowing systems to be developed that will allow rights holders to be remunerated in
line with the actual "consumption" of their programmes.
The next stage will probably be near video on demand, which involves the broadcaster
transmitting the same programme (usually, but not necessarily, a film) at different
starting times. A viewer can thus choose not only the programme he wants to see but
also, within certain limits, the time at which he wants to see it.  This stage will be
followed by the commercial development of actual video on demand, which gives the
viewer complete flexibility over starting times, as they would no longer be
pre-determined by the broadcaster.
The explosion of encryption applications will only take place, however, with the
development of the other services of the Information Society:  not only audiovisual
services, but all the other applications (e.g. interactive teleshopping, tele-information
services, professional on-line services, interactive games, etc.) will, to a varying
degree, have to rely on encryption for their viable development.  Moreover, as
encryption will often be essential for security purposes (e.g. for electronic payment in
the case of teleshopping), synergy between these two encryption applications
(control/security being enhanced by the subscription system) would - under conditions
of legal certainty - make its use even better suited to promoting the development of all
services in the Information Society .
The development of these new services will depend to a large extent on the
establishment of a regulatory framework which simultaneously takes account of the
legitimate requirements of operators and users of the services. In this respect, great
importance will be attached to the solution found on the international and worldwide
level to the multitude of security problems implied in the use of electronic
transactions. These include in particular the regulatory restrictions on the use of
encryption systems, public authorities' control over encrypted communications for
reasons of national security, and the identification and verification of the respective
parties. At present, the Commission, in the framework of its activities on the security
of information systems, is analysing the possibility of establishing, at European level,
organisations which would be responsible for the control and certification, and totally
independent from public authorities.
2. The European market
Europe currently has a total of 180 television channels, transmitted via 27 satellites.10
Many of those channels (79) use some form of encryption (see Table 1) and are
                    
10 European Audiovisual Observatory: 1994/95 Statistical Yearbook on cinema, television, video and
new media in Europe, Strasbourg (1994).13
thematic rather than general (e.g. children's programming, sports channels,
movie channels, etc.).14
Table 1: Number of subscribers to the main pay-television stations ('000 viewers)11
A B CH D DK E Eir F Fin I L NL P S UK
Canal Plus 3700
Sky Movies
Movie Channel
2587
Sky Sports 2579
Canal Plus Esp. 893
Première 35 850
Filmnet 150 100 160 230
Telepiù 650
Sky Multichannel 481
TV 1000 45 230
Adult Channel 5 5 5 167
Canal Plus TVCF 152
Canal Satellite France 142
Filmmax 80
Tele-TV 8 41
Teleclub 90
Canal Satellite Esp. 10
Lumière TV 31
Multichoice 2
Total 35 302 90 855 145 903 0 142 8 655 0 162 0 612 5814
In the future, a sharp increase in the supply of encrypted services can be expected at
the European level. The launching of new, completely digital satellites (e.g. Astra 1e
and 1f) and the spread of fibre optic networks will enable existing operators presently
on the market to increase their supply. Several operators have already announced
details of their plans to launch packages of digital channels.  The Nethold Group, for
instance, which controls Filmnet, will soon launch 150 digital channels, 50 of them
offering films on demand.  BSkyB plans to launch between 16 and 32 pay-per-view
stations towards the end of 1996 as an initial step towards the launch of genuine
video-on-demand services. Canal Plus will also soon provide a package of over
20 digital channels.  In addition to the services already available they will provide a
pay-per-view service, video games and digital radio services. Furthermore a number
of French channels, including TF1, Arte and La Cinquième, will cooperate in the
launch of a package of digital channels using the same satellite.  Lastly, TF1 will
launch a package of services ranging from video on demand to interactive
programmes via five Eutelsat-based transponders.
                    
11 Source: European Audiovisual Observatory: 1994/95 Statistical Yearbook on cinema, television
and new media in Europe, Strasbourg (1994); Libération "Les comptes décryptés de Canal+",
L'Evénement (4 November 1994).15
New operators, in particular telecommunications companies, can also be expected to
enter the market of Information Society services:  British Telecom has already set up a
pilot project in which 2 500 homes can, on demand, receive teleshopping,
video-on-demand, video games and other services.
At present, many channels still cover a particular common language or geographical
market.  Nevertheless it is clear that, in the future, national markets will increasingly
prove too limited. There will therefore be a growing need for easy cross-border access,
for this and the following reasons:
￿ As the number of encrypted services rises, operators will increasingly have to
provide more finely targeted services to satisfy the needs of the market. Since
these particular demands will not satisfactorily be catered for yet, a niche
market could be drawn around a population segment prepared to pay for the
added value offered by the service. With the increase in general-interest
programming broadcast "in clear", encrypted services have developed to
satisfy an increasingly specialized demand, therefore justifying the need for
their remuneration by the final user. Nevertheless, the development of viable,
targeted services requires a market of a certain size, and as for identical
geographical areas, a niche-service market is smaller than a mass-service
market, it can often only be constituted by exploiting a larger geographical
market.
￿ The ability to better satisfy linguistic and cultural requirements. By means of
the new technology, the same channel can be broadcast simultaneously in
several languages by providing separate soundtracks. In addition, the strategy
of interactive services will increasingly be based on specialized services and/or
the supply of packages of services. The first will often satisfy the demand of
transnational niches, i.e. demand based on factors other than purely national
culture, while the second will allow the user to choose what he wants to see.
Thus, with the incorporation of advanced information technology, the service
provider will be able to offer the widest possible choice including in his
package of services films or programmes that take account of national
differences.
￿ The evolution of technological applications. Constant improvements and the
continuous incorporation of audiovisual service distribution systems by the
commercial application of new technologies (satellite broadcasting,
optical fibres, the development of the ISDN network (Integrated Services
Digital Network) at European level so as to link up with IBC (Integrated
Broadband Communication networks) make these services increasingly
independent of the distance between the service provider and the user.
￿ All the regulatory work aimed at the gradual liberalization of
telecommunications (in particular for satellite and cable) and the harmonisation
of cross-border rules on the carrying of signals in Europe (especially for
television signals in the field of programme content and copyright) is just
beginning to have a positive impact on the freedom to provide existing16
audiovisual services between Member States and the development of new
services, a growing proportion of which will be provided in encrypted form.
￿ Changes in the practice of granting broadcasting rights: at present only a
small proportion of the output of encrypted stations can be broadcast across
frontiers, because of the traditionally national systems of granting broadcasting
rights. Encryption will enable future rights to be granted on the basis of the
actual number of users rather than according to national frontiers.
￿ Obtaining the best possible return on transponder costs: since transponder
costs are high, it is economically sensible for the operator to offer his service in
as many areas as possible within the area covered by the satellite.
The development of these services in response to the growing needs of cross-border
markets is, however, being jeopardized by a major problem at European level: piracy.
3. A market exposed to piracy
3.1 Technological development
Due to advanced technology, it is in theory now possible to use a conditional access
system providing such a high level of security that pirates would be incapable of
breaking it. In practice, however, these systems also have to comply with certain
economic and regulatory realities, namely:
￿ Systems must be produced and distributed at a reasonable price, since
consumers will be unwilling to pay more than a certain amount to buy a
decoder,12  depending on the extent to which they find the programmes
interesting or the selection of channels that can be picked up with the system in
question.
￿ The cost of operating the system must not exceed the amount of revenue (i.e.
the income the operator stands to lose if illicit decoding devices are put on sale)
at risk.
￿ Systems must comply with regulatory requirements imposed by certain
Member States on the use of encryption for commercial purposes.
As the need to achieve an acceptable cost for the conditional access system means that
they cannot be made completely secure,  manufacturers of illicit decoding devices
have taken advantage of this situation, and are now even able to keep up with the pace
of technological developments.
The way in which the systems have evolved illustrate this phenomenon. The simplest
conditional access system causes a mix-up of the position of the synchronous pulses
                    
12 Some encryptors have preferred to rent, rather than sell, decoding equipment to their subscribers.
This allows them to distribute the devices at a price which is within the reach of more people and
to ensure the return of the equipment when the subscription expires.17
that form part of the broadcast signals, so that a  standard receiver can no longer lock
its line (horizontal) or field (vertical) timebases. The picture waveform is transmitted
unchanged, but without normal synchronous pulses, the screen displays only a jumble
of picture components.  The synchronizing information is transmitted in a disguised
form (algorithm) which can be detected by the official decoder and used to reconstruct
standard synchronous pulses.  This system has already been widely pirated.13
Second-generation encryption systems work differently. Two of these are now
particularly common:
￿ in the "active line rotation" method the line stays in place, but is cut at
randomly chosen points for each line and the ends are swapped over;
￿ in the "line shuffle" method the lines that make up the picture are reconstituted
in a totally different order. This method is more effective than the first, but also
more expensive, as it needs more storage in the decoder.
The great advantage of both systems is that they completely destroy the structure of
the picture. They can, moreover, be used in conjunction with a "smart card" that
"reads" the incoming signal and issues instructions to the decoder telling it how to
decode it. The three most widely used encryption systems in Europe (Videocrypt,
Syster and Eurocrypt) belong to this second generation.
Research is still being carried out, however, into systems that provide even more
security. The current process of the convergence of telecommunications and
audiovisual services and the application of digital technology to broadcasting will
allow encryption systems to be developed that are more and more sophisticated and
secure. After all, the decomposition of content into bytes is in itself a form of
encryption.14
Moreover, in order to allow the introduction of interactive services, decoders
themselves will gradually become "set-top boxes", i.e. actual computers controlled by
a smart card that will both identify the user and activate encryption functions for the
incoming and outgoing signals. These devices will thus make it possible to pick up the
signal, decode it, perhaps change its contents and incorporate it into another medium,
record it and print it. They will also be able to interact with traditional equipment
(video tape recorders, computers, CD and the new video disc players), and to send
back to the operator an encrypted signal, perhaps with confidential financial data,
designed to help analyse demand.
3.2 The consequences of piracy
                    
13 The pirate decoders are believed to reconstruct the sequence of delays by monitoring the start
point of successive active lines.  A decoder design was even published some years ago in the
French press.
14 The standardization of encryption systems for digital broadcasting that has taken place in the
context of the work of DVB (Digital Video Broadcasting Group) is a major step towards the
general use of encryption technology and an increase in the level of security.18
In some Member States, however, the manufacture and marketing of unauthorised
decoding devices and the manipulation of authorised devices so as to allow access to a
service in breach of the conditions laid down with regard to time (duration of the
subscription) and quantity (number of channels) have now become highly lucrative.15  In
those Member States, they have given rise to parallel activities, such as the publication
of specialized magazines and the setting-up of maintenance and after-sales services.
The fact that they allow illicit reception of encrypted services has several adverse
consequences:
￿ the encryptors are deprived of the subscription revenue they would have
obtained if the customer had purchased a lawful device (about ECU 200-250
annually for each unauthorised receiver);
￿ in some cases it is necessary to replace the pirated system. Operators spend
vast sums each year (from ECU 60 000 to more than ECU 1.2 million per
operator, according to the survey) on system protection (controlling
distribution, making improvements, changing cards, etc.). Even control
systems based on removable smart cards, which seemed more immune than
most, have been compromised. It was at first claimed that if a system was
pirated, it could be safeguarded simply by a new issue of cards.  In fact, when
the number of subscribers is very large, the cost of replacing all the cards can
be a significant drain on earnings. On top of the cost of each smart card,16  there
are the code development costs, postage and other costs (the survey revealed
that making pirated systems secure again can cost more than ECU 45 million);
￿ the time needed to develop a new system. Turning once again to the example of
the smart cards, an operator wishing to replace its card would need some time
to develop a new one. Meanwhile, the only available course of action would be
to engage in a series of temporary electronic countermeasures until it can issue
a new smart card. This is a risky situation, especially since pirates anticipate
the countermeasures and take appropriate avoiding action. In addition, there
would inevitably need to be a period of time in which both the old card and the
new card would remain operational.  This means that the pirate cards in
circulation would also last through the transition period, giving pirates enough
time to develop a new pirate card.  With the assistance of private investors,
pirates can now produce their own cards and chips almost as quickly as the
broadcasters. Other techniques aimed at disabling pirate cards (e.g. sending
de-activating signals that disconnect only unauthorised cards) have proved
short-lived (in this particular case, because pirate manufacturers themselves
distribute devices specifically designed to block out the de-activating signal).
￿ financial harm to those holding rights in the programmes. Since the fees paid
to rightholders generally also take into account the potential audience, the fact
that encrypted programmes are picked up via illicit reception deprives
                    
15 It is estimated that unauthorized decoding equipment now accounts for 5-20% of the total market.
16 Between ECU 5 and ECU 25.19
rightholders of the income they would have received from subscription revenue
if the customer had purchased an authorised decoder instead. Moreover, when
negotiations take place regarding rights in respect of subsequent (in clear)
broadcasts, rightholders will find it more difficult to secure high levels of
remuneration because of illicit reception which had already occurred when the
material was broadcast on the encrypted channel;
￿ the loss of income and credibility for suppliers of the technology. When
selecting an encryption system, operators will want to be sure that the system
chosen is the most secure, so that they can provide those holding the rights in
the programmes with a guarantee that a broadcast they have authorised will not
be pirated; a high incidence of illicit decoding devices might be construed as
evidence that a system is not very effective;
￿ the fact that market confidence in the system would be undermined. The market
requires confidence in encryption if the notion of exclusiveness associated with
the services is to be maintained and if the window created in the media
chronology is to be justified.  Illicit reception erodes that confidence in such a
manner that rightholders will become reluctant to license first-run
programming, broadcasters will not be prepared to pay high licence fees and
consumers will be reluctant to pay subscription fees.
￿ the consumers could be mislead about the origin of the decoding device they
are purchasing and thus believe they are buying authorised device, whereas it
is in fact a pirated decoder.  In this case, if the operator modifies the encryption
system for security reasons, the device purchased would be of no use to the
consumer, who would have to pay for another decoder.  Moreover, the service
providers pass on the losses they suffer from piracy onto the price of, or rental
charges for, authorised devices made available to consumers.
As well as these direct consequences there are indirect effects on the development of
the market in new encrypted services. Clearly, development will be possible only if an
adequate level of security is guaranteed for operators to be willing to engage in
activities requiring heavy initial investment.
4. A market covered by fragmented rules
In order to deal with the pirate industry, technology has had to be supplemented by
legislation as part of a regulatory process at Member State level.  This process has
followed different approaches and is still not complete. The legislation will be
examined in Chapter 3.
According to the media industry, such  regulatory fragmentation could well entail
difficulties for the development of encrypted services at European level and adversely
affect the proper operation of the Internal Market. Since the transnational dimension
will become increasingly necessary for the growth of a truly European encrypted
services industry, the absence of an equivalent level of legal protection against piracy
could well have an adverse effect on the development of those services on a European
scale.20
As confirmed by the consultation, operators could, because of the absence of legal
protection in one or more countries where reception is possible, decide not to cover a
Member State, for fear of the consequences of piracy in that country. Effective legal
protection weighs heavily in an operator's decision to market his service in a given
Member State.
In addition, the cost of research into national laws and of possible legal proceedings in
the event of piracy in the various Member States means additional costs to operators
and to their activities, thus adversely affecting the development of the service.
When negotiations covering programme rights take place, the absence of equivalent
legal protection in every Member State where reception is possible will make it more
difficult to secure those rights since (especially in the case of recent works) operators
cannot guarantee that there will be no illicit access in other Member States. It will also
be more difficult to determine what remuneration the  rightholders should receive,
given that the actual audience in the signal reception area cannot be determined
accurately. Operators will thus find it more difficult to secure rights at a reasonable
price, and this will have repercussions on their cross-border activities in particular.
Since certain methods of transmission are more exposed to illicit access than others (in
particular off-air or satellite transmission as compared with cable distribution, which is
generally more secure due to the physical link with the viewer), operators may well
choose not to use some of those methods feeling that the risk of piracy is higher. Thus,
in the absence of effective legal protection, certain transmission systems, in particular
those with the strongest transnational potential, might be used less often than others.
The absence of equivalent legal protection in Member States will also have negative
consequences if illicit equipment is imported from third countries.  Such equipment
will be able to enter the Community via a Member State which does not prohibit its
marketing or distribution and can then easily arrive in another Member State, making
the latter's efforts to combat illicit reception ineffective.
What is more, the disparity between rules on illicit reception will result in distortions
of competition between operators in different countries. Those who transmit signals in
Member States providing a high level of legal protection will have a competitive
advantages (this will be reflected in their programme-purchasing ability, for instance)
over those who distribute their signal in a State where there is no legal protection,
since they will have to bear additional costs through having to use a particularly secure
encryption system.
Lastly there is a risk that, as a result of differences between solutions in the
Member States, the opportunities afforded by the Directive on the Use of Standards
for the Transmission of Television Signals17  will be lost. The use of increasingly
standardized systems will be hindered by the fact that the level of legal protection
against illicit access is not the same in all the Member States from which the
programmes are broadcast. This means that the level of security of the system and the
means used to distribute decoding equipment will have to vary with the Member State
                    
17 Directive 95/47/EC (see above).21
of reception, leading to further fragmentation in an audiovisual area which, to some
extent, ought to be standardized. In this respect, DVB (European Digital Video
Broadcasting Group, which is at the origin of the digital television standards partly
reproduced in Directive 95/47/EC has, in the context of its experts' group on the piracy
of encrypted services adopted a recommendation underlining the need to provide
operators throughout the Union with a clear and uniform regulatory framework that
can be relied upon in the event of illicit access to encrypted services.22
Chapter 2: International rules
1. Recommendations of The Council of Europe
In September 1991 the Council of Europe adopted and addressed to its Member States
a Recommendation on  the legal protection of encrypted television services.18  The
Recommendation was later updated by another, adopted in January 1995, on measures
against sound and audiovisual piracy.19
In the preamble, the Council of Europe emphasizes the benefits of the development in
Europe of pay television on the European audio-visual production sector. The Council
of Europe recognizes that encrypted broadcasting services contribute to the diversity
of programmes offered to the public, increase the possibilities of exploitation of
protected works and are likely to increase the sources of financing of works and
programmes in Europe.
The Recommendation goes on to highlight the adverse consequences of illicit access
to encrypted broadcasting services and sets out the range of activities which are to be
considered unlawful:
￿ the manufacture of decoding equipment where manufacture is designed to
enable access to an encrypted service by those outside the audience determined
by the encrypting organization;
￿ the importation of decoding equipment where importation is designed to enable
access to an encrypted service by those outside the audience determined by the
encrypting organization;
￿ the distribution of decoding equipment where distribution is designed to enable
access to an encrypted service by those outside the audience determined by the
encrypting organization;
￿ the commercial promotion and advertising of the manufacture, importation or
distribution of decoding equipment referred to above;
￿ the possession of decoding equipment where possession is designed, for
commercial purposes, to enable access to an encrypted service by those outside
the audience determined by the encrypting organization.
Member States are free to determine that possession of equipment for private use is
also to be considered as an unlawful activity.
The Recommendation defines an encrypted service as "any television service,
transmitted or retransmitted by any technical means, the technical characteristics of
                    
18 Recommendation No R (91) 14 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the legal
protection of encrypted television services.
19 Recommendation No R (95) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to the Member States on measures
against sound and audiovisual piracy.23
which are modified or altered in order to restrict its access to a specific audience". The
Council of Europe emphasizes in the explanatory memorandum that the definition
(and, by the same token, the protection arising therefrom) applies to all organizations
offering encrypted services, whether at local, regional, national or transnational level,
irrespective of the country of origin of the broadcast.
The protection guaranteed by the Council of Europe is not subject to the requirement
of reciprocity. As the Council of Europe emphasizes in the explanatory memorandum,
non-application to services originating from other countries could well give rise to
problems for services originating from the country of reception.
The Recommendation defines decoding equipment as "any device, apparatus or
equipment designed or specially adapted, totally or partially, to enable access in the
clear to an encrypted service, that is to say without the modification or alteration of its
characteristics".20
Finally, distribution is defined as the sale, rental or commercial installation of
decoding equipment, as well as the possession of decoding equipment with a view to
carrying out those activities. This covers commercial, not private activities.
The Recommendation urges Member States to provide for criminal or administrative
sanctions in respect of all of the above-mentioned activities, with one exception. The
marketing and advertising of the manufacture, importation or distribution of unlawful
equipment does not give rise to criminal or administrative sanctions.21
The civil remedies proposed in the Recommendation provide that, in addition to the
criminal sanctions, the injured encrypting organization should be able to take action
against those involved in unlawful activities to obtain damages, or a share of the
profits.
There are no rights of action for the rights owners of programmes included in the
services. The Council's view, as expressed in the explanatory memorandum, is that
although holders of the rights in broadcast programmes may suffer if illicit access
occurs, this damage is indirect. The explanatory memorandum also states that a rights
holder can ensure its interests are protected contractually by requiring the broadcaster
to take legal action against illicit access.22
                    
20 As stated by the Council of Europe in the explanatory memorandum, the principles of the
Recommendation are to apply exclusively to the part of the decoder that enables the signal to be
decrypted. Thus, in the case of a system using smart cards, the part covered would be the card only
and not the decoder as such since the latter cannot, on its own, decrypt the signal.
21 The Council of Europe justifies the exception on the grounds that sanctions should be aimed
exclusively at manufacturers, importers and distributors of unlawful decoding equipment, and not
at organizations that simply carry material used for commercial promotion or advertising
(advertising agencies, newspapers and magazines).
22 While it is true that rightholders may include such clauses in contracts, this does not obviate the
need to protect interests specific to the rights holder independently of those of broadcasters. When
the unlawful activity affects the rights holder and not the broadcaster the broadcaster may have
little incentive to act swiftly against those activities. Admittedly, the rights holder could take legal24
Finally, the Recommendation does not provide for any sanctions, either civil or
criminal, in respect of private possession of unlawful equipment.
The Recommendation has played a major role in the regulatory movement at
Member State level that began in the early 1990s: specific national regulations on the
legal protection of encrypted broadcasting services introduced at the time have often
been inspired by the principles enshrined in the Recommendation.
However, in view of the very nature of the text, which is not binding, there are
substantial differences between regulations, in particular with regard to scope,
unlawful activities and the level of sanctions. Moreover, a number of Member States
have not yet transposed the principles of the Recommendation into national law, thus
giving rise to the present regulatory fragmentation at European level.
2. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Study
In the context of the current talks on the draft Protocol to the Berne Convention and
on the New Instrument for the protection of the rights of performers and producers of
phonograms, the draft memorandum drawn up by the International Bureau in
April 199423  suggests, in Chapter IX "Enforcement of rights", looking into the
possibility of including measures against the abuse of technical devices.
It is suggested, in the context of those provisions, that the manufacture, importation
and distribution, for sale or rental, of any device enabling or assisting the reception of
an encrypted program broadcast or otherwise communicated to the public, by those
who are not entitled to receive it should rank as breaches of copyright.
Moreover, the rightholders of a programme decrypted by means of an unlawful
decoding device would be able to take legal action to obtain compensation.
Since the talks are still under way, it is too soon to say whether these proposals will be
included in the final text.  However, if they are included, the scope would not be
limited to broadcasting but would cover any form of "communication to the public" of
the protected work.
                                                                                                                                                      
action against the broadcaster to enforce the original contractual provisions, but this acts as a
further delay in the action against the pirate.
23 Doc. WIPO 9099D/COP/0691D of 29 April 1994.25
Chapter 3: Member States' legislation
1. Overview
The analysis of the regulatory environment focuses on the solutions provided by
national legislations to the problem of illicit reception of an encrypted service, i.e.
reception, without payment and/or authorisation, by persons not authorised by the
service provider.
A succinct analysis of the regulatory solutions of each Member State to the problem of
illicit reception of encrypted services is set out below. It should however be noted that
the legislative environment can evolve very rapidly and any "snapshot" could cease to
be relevant within a very short time.
2. Regulatory environment in the Member States (summary)
A single systematic approach to the problems raised by illicit reception of encrypted
services does not currently exist in Europe. In certain countries, there are, in fact,
specific regulations, others resort to existing provisions, while some do not have any
legal protection.
In this respect it should also be noted that although the "cable and satellite" Directive24
has harmonised the treatment of protected works used in satellite broadcasting and the
management of cable retransmission within the Community, it does not in any way
assist operators in their fight against illicit reception.
Indeed right holders could, under certain conditions, prohibit the unauthorised
retransmission of their works but not unauthorised reception. This is because the latter
does not consitute a relevant "act" for the purposes of copyright which covers
traditionally communication and does not cover the reception of a protected work.
Consequently, the national regulations implementing the Directive will not be of any
use in preventing illicit reception of encrypted services.
Table I: Legislation on the protection of encrypted services
Specific legislation General legislation
Broadcasting Telecommunications Intellectual property Criminal law Unfair competition Intellectual
property
Austria x
Belgium x x
Denmark
Finland x
France x x
Germany x
Greece
Ireland x
Italy x
Luxembourg
Netherlands x x
Portugal
Spain x
Sweden x
United
Kingdom
x x
                    
24 Directive 93/83/CEE mentioned above.26
2.1 Application of provisions on unfair competition and Intellectual Property
Countries which do not have any specific rules on this subject often make use of other
more general legislation, in particular that of unfair competition, which protects
against dishonest trade practices. The application of these principles has in some cases
paved the way for a ban on the manufacture, importation and marketing (sale, rental or
possession for commercial purposes) of unauthorised decoding devices (A, B, D
and NL).
Generally, this has been based on the fact that unauthorised manufacturing and
marketing of decoding devices deprive the encryptor of the remuneration normally
payable in respect of the service provided. Unauthorised manufacturers would in
effect be paid for a service that was being provided by someone else.
It has been recognized in some cases that there is competition between encryptors and
manufacturers of illegal decoders, a precondition for applying the rules on unfair
competition.25  For this to apply, the party concerned must in effect be present on the
market. The principles of unfair competition would not apply in the absence of a
commercial interest which needs protection.
Moreover, an action based on unfair competition laws can normally be brought only in
respect of the distribution and marketing of unauthorised decoding devices, not
against their importation or possession. This means that it is difficult to start an action
before the devices have actually been marketed or to request preventive measures.
Other general rules have proved unwieldy. Admittedly, in cases of unauthorised
manufacture of decoding devices, industrial property law already gives rightholders
some protection. Several components of the device will indeed be covered by
industrial property or intellectual property rights.
However, such action has often proved ineffective. On the one hand, in order to prove
that a smart card contains a copy of the system owners software, the encryption
algorithm, and by the same token the technology used, will have to be disclosed in the
course of the proceedings, thus opening the door to further copying. On the other
hand, proceedings based on the industrial property contained in the card would prove
pointless in the case of genuine cards fraudulently reactivated after their period of
validity had expired.
Such a course of action is in any case not always open to encryptors since they do not
hold the industrial property rights concerned and cannot, therefore, institute
proceedings against manufacturers of unlawful devices.
2.2 Application of specific regulations
Specific legislation on the protection of encrypted services against illicit access is a
fairly recent phenomenon, resulting from the technological development seen in the
                    
25 In this respect, an Austrian Court of Appeal recognised explicitly (Case Teleclub v Olbort) that
actual competition between parties is not required, where the goods are, by their nature, already
competitive.27
communication sector in the late 1970s. Following the wave of illicit decoding devices
that flooded the market in countries where encrypted broadcasting was most
developed (F, UK), the first regulations were adopted in 1987 in France and in 1988 in
the UK.
A second wave of legislation took place in the early 1990s, as encrypted stations
spread across Europe, viz. the legislation adopted in Ireland, Belgium (1991),
Italy (1992), Finland and Sweden (1994). This process is not yet over, as shown by the
debate in Denmark concerning the presentation of a draft law.
Where it exists, the legislation has traditionally been in the form of a specific
audiovisual law which, modelling itself on copyright rules, provides for criminal
sanctions for certain activities relating to the illicit reception of encrypted services and
gives operators, and in some cases other interested parties, the right to claim damages
from those responsible for such activities.
Accordingly, the situation with regard to current national regulations on the protection
of encrypted services can be summarised up as follows:
2.2.1 Objective of the measures: protecting encrypted services against illicit
reception
Although the national regulations concerned do not all have the same definition of
illicit reception - this is sometimes referred to as receiving pay-television programmes
without paying the fee (B, F, UK) or access to an encrypted system without the
encryptor's authorisation (S, I) - the objective is invariably the same: to ensure that
only authorised people can receive the service.
There is, however, a division between legislation which covers only broadcasting and
cable distribution services, i.e. where the same programme is communicated to the
public at large (I, F, B, IRL, S) and legislation that also covers information services
which are carried on networks and function on individual demand (SF, UK, NL); the
latter makes no distinction between services communicated to the general public and
services sent on demand.
Where legal protection against illicit reception of an encrypted broadcasting service is
available, it normally protects every type of broadcasting signal, whereas this is not
always the case for radio services. However, some Member States (UK, IRL) grant
such protection on the basis of the origin (national or foreign) or of how the service is
broadcast (by satellite or terrestrial).28
Table II: Types of protected services
Protected signals Broadcasting Radio Other Against pay only
Cable Satellite Other
Austria
Belgium x x x x
Denmark
Finland x x x x x
France x x x x
Germany
Greece
Ireland x x
Italy x x x x
Luxembourg
Netherlands x x x x x x
Portugal
Spain
Sweden x x x x x
United Kingdom x Only for services
originating in the
UK
x x x x
National legislation has followed two approaches to protect service providers against
reception by unauthorised persons.
The first consists in protecting the encrypted signal. This is normally done by
recognising the encryptor's right of ownership in respect of the signal. The
unauthorised reception of the encrypted signal is therefore regarded as "theft", against
which the owner has a right to be protected (B (French Community), IRL, I, UK, NL,
SF). As a secondary effect, legislation of this type sometimes prohibits retransmission,
interception and activities related thereto, in so far as they facilitate and/or allow illicit
reception of the signal.
Table III. Types of action
Encrypted television services Interception Use Transmission Organise/allow
reception by third
parties
Austria
Belgium
* x x x
Denmark
Finland x
France x x x
Germany
Greece
Ireland x x
Italy x x
Luxembourg
Netherlands x
Portugal
Spain
Sweden x
United Kingdom x x x
*
French-speaking Community only
The second approach consists in focusing directly on the need to prohibit preparatory
activities (B (Flemish Community), F and S). Unauthorised reception as such will thus
no longer be regarded as an unlawful activity, but the commercial activities facilitating
it would nevertheless be prohibited.
Such a difference of approach impacts on the extent of the protection. As a rule,
legislation based on the protection of signals against theft prohibits all preparatory29
activities, be they for commercial or for private purposes. Those, however, that deal
exclusively with the preparatory activities do not cover the behaviour of individuals.
Table IV. Purpose of unlawful activities concerning decoding devices
Commercial Non-commercial
Austria
Belgium x x
Denmark
Finland x x
France x x
Germany
Greece
Ireland x x
Italy x
Luxembourg
Netherlands x x
Portugal
Spain
Sweden x
United Kingdom x x
Depending on the circumstances, the preparatory activities, which may either be an
ancillary target of the ban on reception or be the specific subject of the legislation, can
be placed under the following headings:
(a) Manufacture of decoding devices intended to enable reception of an encrypted
service without payment of the subscription fee.
To ensure that private individuals can only receive the programme by means of
the equipment manufactured directly by the encryptor or on his behalf, all the
regulations concerned prohibit the manufacture of devices intended solely to
enable reception of an encrypted service without payment of the subscription
fee (B, F, I, S, SF, NL, UK and IRL);
(b) Importation of decoding devices intended to enable reception of an encrypted
service without payment of the subscription fee.
With the gradual elimination of border controls there is undoubtedly a greater
risk that unauthorised devices manufactured in a Member State which does not
prohibit their manufacture might subsequently be imported for the purpose of
enabling reception of an encrypted service without payment of any charge. The
laws of some Member States (B, F, I, UK, SF and IRL) accordingly prohibit
the importation of decoding devices designed to enable reception of an
encrypted service without payment of the subscription fee;
(c) Distribution of decoding devices intended to enable reception of an encrypted
service without payment of the subcription fee.
The activity which constitutes, however, the most serious threat to encrypted
service providers is without doubt the marketing of equipment intended to
enable reception of their service without payment of the subscription fee. To
guard against this possibility, national legislation normally prohibits the
distribution of decoding devices designed to enable reception of an encrypted
service without payment of the subscription fee (B, F, I, S, UK, IRL, SF and
NL);30
(d) Possession, for commercial purposes, of decoding devices intended to enable
reception of an encrypted service without payment of the subscription fee.
Possession for commercial purposes, in particular with a view to sale and/or
rental, is another stage in the sequence of fraudulent activity leading to
reception of an encrypted service without payment of the subscription fee; that
is why some regulations (B, F, I, IRL, SF and NL) prohibit the possession, for
commercial purposes, of decoding devices intended to enable reception of an
encrypted service without payment of the subscription fee;
(e) Possession, for private use, of decoding devices intended to enable reception
of encrypted service without payment of the subscription fee.
Although possession, for private use, of decoding devices intended to enable
access to  an encrypted service without payment of the subscription fee is
intrinsically a less serious activity than possession for commercial purposes,
some Member States (UK, NL, B, F and IRL) have taken the view that even
the private possession of an unauthorised device should be prohibited;
(f) Marketing of decoding devices intended to enable reception of an encrypted
service without payment of the subscription fee.
Where there are rules aimed at protecting the service provider against illicit
reception, the laws of some Member States (B, F, UK, I, NL and IRL) also
prohibit marketing activities for devices intended to enable reception of
encrypted services without payment of the subscription fee;
Table V. Unlawful activities concerning decoding devices
Decoding
devices
Manufacture Importation Distribution Marketing and
advertising
Possession for
commercial
purposes
Possession for
private use
Austria
Belgium
* x x x x x x
Denmark
Finland x x x x x
France x x x x x x
Germany
Greece
Ireland x x x x x x
Italy x x x x x x
Luxembourg
Netherlands x x x x x
Portugal
Spain
Sweden x x
United Kingdom x x x x
*Flemish Community only
Most Member States also prohibit other ancillary activities, all of which are connected
with the marketing of decoding devices.31
Table VI. Other unlawful activities concerning decoding devices 
Decoding devices Adapt Sell Rent Install Maintain Use Buy Other
Austria
Belgium x x x x
Denmark
Finland x
France x x x
Germany
Greece
Ireland x x
Italy x x
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden x x x x
United Kingdom x x
2.2.2 Sanctions
National regulations generally provide for criminal or administrative sanctions if the
law is broken, as well as the possibility of civil proceedings to obtain damages and
interest.  On the latter point there are several possible scenarios.
In the first case, no reference is made in the specific regulation to an action for
damages and interest, which would normally mean that general principles should be
applied (B, F, I and NL).
In the second case, there may be a specific reference to rules covering actions for
damages and interest (such as the Danish draft law). The explanatory memorandum to
the draft Law states that both service providers and right holders of a broadcast should
be able to claim damages and interest for the losses caused by the activities of
unauthorised manufacturers.
The third possibility is that of a provision that applies the civil remedies of copyright
holders (UK). This includes the possibility of obtaining cessation of the fraudulent
activity and the indemnisation of damages and interest.  The final possibility is that of
a provision containing specific civil remedies, that states who may bring proceedings
and the possible types of actions (IRL).32
Table VII. Sanctions
Sanctions Fine Prison sentence Administrative
provisions
Civil provisions
Austria
Belgium BFR 26 to 100 000
(ECU 0.7 to 650)
Confiscation of decoding
equipment, forfeiture of
profits
Denmark
Finland fine up to two years Seizure of equipment,
forfeiture of profit
France FF 5 000 to 200 000
(ECU 772 to 30 880)
up to two years Seizure of the technical
information, seizure and
confiscation of devices
and advertising material,
forfeiture of profit
Germany
Greece
Ireland up to IRL 20 000
(ECU 24 554)
up to two years Seizure and forfeiture of
equipment used in the
commission of the
offence
Specific remedies
Italy LIT 500 000 to
6 million (ECU 220
to 2 645)
3 months - 3 years
Luxembourg
Netherlands up to HFL 100 000
(ECU 48 670)
up to three years Forfeiture of goods,
forfeiture of profit
Portugal
Spain
Sweden fine up to six months Seizure of objects and
equipment used in the
commission of the
offence, forfeiture of
profit
United Kingdom up to UKL 5 000
(ECU 6 045)
up to two years Copyright remedies Proceedings under
copyright law
2.2.3 Disparities between measures
From the above, it is clear that there are major disparities between existing legislation,
in particular as regards:
￿ scope (domestic services or services originating in other Member States;
broadcasting services or any encrypted service, including services on
individual demand);
￿ the degree of protection (ban on possession for private use and on marketing);
￿ the person who may bring proceedings for civil remedies (encryptor or any
party concerned);
￿ the level of sanctions.
These disparities are even more marked in the absence of specific legislation.
Conclusion
In the late 1980s some Member States began to adopt specific legislation aimed at
protecting encrypted services against illicit reception by means of unauthorised
decoding devices. In order to provide the same protection, other Member States apply
existing general legislative provisions that are already included in their legislation33
(unfair competition, intellectual property laws). And yet another group of Member
States provide no such protection at present.
This means that there are disparities between the legal treatment of the illicit
reception of an encrypted service in the European Union: some activities may be
prohibited in some Member States but be legal in others.
Q 1: The Commission would like to have any additional information to enable it to
examine national regulations in greater detail.34
CHAPTER 4: BARRIERS TO THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET
In view of the regulatory environment in the Member States, the Commission
considers that the present legislative differencies can create obstacles to the free
movement of goods and services and can thus damage the efficient operation of the
Internal Market.
Some of these obstacles seem incompatible with the principles of the Treaty and will
therefore have to be removed.  This applies, first, to certain national regulations which
make a distinction, for the purposes of legal protection against illicit reception, based
on the origin of the service.  Under such rules, services originating from other
Member States are sometimes protected against illicit reception only if the national
authority has first issued a certificate which entitles them to such protection.26
Secondly, other regulations simply make it impossible for some services to obtain
protection, because of the means of transmission used, e.g. when only hertzian
services or services carried by cables are protected against illicit reception, whereas
encrypted satellite services, all of which are of foreign origin, do not enjoy such
protection.27   This is consequently disguised discrimination.
In these cases the transfrontier provision of services, such as that which exists between
the subscriber and the encryptor, would be rendered more difficult than the provision
of national services.  The latter would be automatically protected, whereas services
originating from other Member States would not be so protected or would have to
obtain prior authorisation in order to enjoy such protection.  These measures do not
seem justifiable in the light of European Court of Justice case-law.  Indeed
discriminatory measures affecting the freedom to provide services are compatible with
Community law only if they can be brought within an express derogation, such as that
contained in Article 56 of the Treaty, which refers to grounds of public policy, public
security or public health.28   In these particular cases, it would appear that none of the
grounds in question could justify such discrimination.  In this regard, the Commission
may put an end to such discrimination as part of its monitoring of the application of
Community law.
By contrast, the analysis of national regulations has identified a number of obstacles to
the free movement of goods and services which might be justified by a public interest
objective, and therefore compatible with the principles of the Treaty.  For these
obstacles, an initiative to ensure the operation of the Internal Market might be
necessary.
1. Obstacles to the free movement of decoding devices (Article 30 et seq.)
                    
26 See British regulations.
27 See Irish regulations.
28 Case C-288/89 "Mediawet" [1991] ECR I-4007.35
Article 30 of the Treaty states that quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.29   Manufacturing
and marketing prohibitions are indistinctly applicable regulations30  which have
restrictive effects on trade, in so far as they erect barriers to the importation and
marketing of products originating in other Member States.
In the light of the case-law of the Court, these prohibitions are justified because they
pursue public interest objectives.  First, they aim to protect the encryptor against those
who might fraudulently profit from his activities (namely manufacturers and
distributors of unauthorised decoding devices), and to protect the consumer against
the marketing of devices which, as they are not official, would no longer guarantee
reception of the service if the operator were to change the system.  This objective,
which aims to ensure that trade is conducted within a framework of equity and
fairness, is one of the general or public interest objectives which, according to the
Court, may justify an obstacle to the free movement of goods.  The protection of
consumers and the fairness of commercial transactions have on several occasions
                    
29 In this context it should be remembered that the Court of Justice traditionally defines quantitative
restrictions as prohibitions or limits on imports, and measures having equivalent effect to
quantitative restrictions as "all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade" (Case 8/74
Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837).
However, within this last category the Court makes a distinction.  On one side, it places trading
rules which constitute measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions and are
incompatible with Article 30 since they impose conditions applicable solely to imported products
or make their sale or use more difficult or costly than the disposal of domestic production
(measures that are applied distinctly).  Where such measures, like quantitative restrictions, are
discriminatory, they may, according to the Court, be justified only on the basis of the grounds
listed in Article 36.
On the other side, as regards trading rules which have identical effects on imported and domestic
products, the Court has stated that, even if they are equally applicable to domestic and imported
products (measures that are indistinctly applied), these national rules may not create barriers to a
product lawfully produced and/or marketed in another Member State unless they are necessary to
satisfy mandatory requirements (in which the Court includes, in addition to the grounds of public
interest listed in Article 36, public health, consumer or environmental protection, the fairness of
commercial transactions, etc.) (Case 120/78 "Cassis de Dijon" [1979] ECR 649;  Case 216/84
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic  [1988] ECR 793).
In this case, obstacles to the free movement of goods resulting from disparities between the
national laws will be justified where there is a direct link between the laws and the mandatory
requirement (causality criterion), where the laws are appropriate and not excessive in relation to
the requirement (proportionality criterion), where there is no equivalent legislation in the country
of origin, and where there are no alternative solutions which would enable the objective to be
attained while creating less disturbance for trade flows (substitution criterion).
Consequently, even though a national law is applicable without distinction, it could still be a
measure having equivalent effect when the restrictive effects it entails on intra-Community trade,
though justified by a mandatory requirement, go beyond what is necessary for the attainment of
the result.
30 They do not have the effect of favouring domestic production and entail the same restrictions for
both domestic and imported products.36
been recognized by the Court as justification for barriers to the free movement of
goods.31
Secondly, these prohibitions aim to ensure the right to remuneration of  the intellectual
property right holders of encrypted broadcasts and industrial and intellectual property
right holders in respect of devices.32   However, the objective of ensuring the right to
legitimate remuneration, whether it is the remuneration of the right holders for
programmes or that of the right holders for the technology contained in unauthorised
devices, is one of the rights which, under the  case-law of the ECJ, is the specific aim
of industrial and intellectual property.33
These rules also respect the proportionality criterion, since they confine themselves to
prohibiting the marketing of devices manufactured without the prior authorisation of
the encryptor, irrespective of their domestic or foreign origins; therefore they do not
go beyond what is necessary for the attainment of the objective.34   Finally, they also
respect the substitution and equivalence criterion, since there are no alternative and
less restrictive measures that would ensure the desired protection.
In conclusion, an obstacle to the free movement of decoding devices manufactured
and marketed in the State of origin,  without the prior consent of the encryptor,  may
be justified by consumer protection and the fairness of commercial transactions, as
well as by the protection of industrial or intellectual property.
2. Obstacles  to the free movement of services relating to decoding devices
(Article 59 et seq.)
The analysis of national regulations has shown that some laws prohibit activities
which are ancillary to the manufacture and marketing of illicit decoding devices.  This
applies to regulations which prohibit the marketing, installation, maintenance and
replacement of illicit decoding devices.
These activities constitute the provision of services within the meaning of Articles 59
and 60 of the Treaty.  Although these prohibitions are indistinctly applicable, they
nevertheless do have restrictive effects on the free movement of services.  Marketing
                    
31 Case 22/71 "Bequelin" [1971] ECR 970:; Case 58/80 Dansk Supermarked a/s v a/s Immerco
[1981] ECR 181.
32 This is why some national regulations refer to copyright provisions.  Indeed they give the parties
concerned (normally the encryptors) the same rights as are given to the right holders of a work
protected against an unauthorised copy of the work itself.  In both cases, the unauthorised copy,
whether of a work or of a decoding device which permits reception of a service, deprives the right
holder, or the supplier, of his legitimate remuneration.
33 Case 78/70 "Deutsche Grammophon" [1971] ECR 502.
34 By contrast, if the prohibitions in question were applied to the import and marketing of devices
manufactured and marketed in the Member State of origin with the consent of the encryptor, they
would be liable to result in economic barriers which would be disproportionate to the objective,
and therefore incompatible with the principles on the free movement of goods as interpreted by the
Court.37
activities and/or after-sales services carried out by service providers established in
other Member States would be prohibited.
Nevertheless, according to the case-law of the Court,35  these restrictive effects may be
justified; in fact these laws pursue public interest objectives such as the protection of
consumers36  and industrial and intellectual property.37   In addition, these restrictive
effects do not go beyond what is necessary for the attainment of the objective, and
may therefore be regarded as proportionate.38
In conclusion, prohibitions on the marketing, installation, maintenance and
replacement of decoding devices manufactured and marketed in the State of origin
without the prior consent of the encryptor may be justified by the need to protect
consumers and industrial and intellectual property.
3. Obstacles to the free movement of encrypted services
Obstacles to the free movement of encrypted services may also result from the
absence of legal protection in certain receiving States.  The consultation conducted by
the Commission has confirmed that operators consider effective legal protection
against illicit reception of the service to be an important factor when deciding whether
to distribute the service in a country.  The absence of such legal protection certainly
makes marketing more difficult and more haphazard.  Operators will have to bear
additional costs due not only to the use of a particularly secure system, but also to the
need to adopt particularly costly distribution systems for the decoding devices
(normally rental).
                    
35 The ECJ has drawn a distinction between discriminatory restrictions and those applicable without
discrimination. The former could be justified by one of the grounds listed in Article 56 (public
policy, public security or public health).  However, with regard to measures which would result in
restrictions which are applicable without discrimination, the ECJ has held that Article 59 requires
not only the elimination of all discrimination against a service provider on the grounds of his
nationality, but also "the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to
national providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or
otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State
where he lawfully provides similar services".  (Case 76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer and Co.
Ltd  [1991] ECR I-4221).  According to the Court it follows that a prohibition, which is applicable
without discrimination could nevertheless constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide
services insofar as it established obstacles which were not justified by overriding reasons relating
to the public interest, insofar as that interest is not already protected by the rules to which the
services provider is subject in the State of establishment, and insofar as the same result cannot be
obtained by less restrictive rules.  The Court includes among these overriding reasons relating to
the public interest the protection of consumers and workers, industrial and commercial property
etc.
36 Case 220/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663.
37 Case 62/79 Coditel [1980] ECR 881.
38 The solution would probably be different in the case of devices manufactured and marketed in the
State of origin with the consent of the encryptor.  In this case, these restrictions would in fact
create barriers to trade between Member States which were disproportionate in relation to the
objectives to be achieved, and therefore incompatible with the principles of the Treaty on the
freedom to provide services, as interpreted by the Court.38
A legal void of this kind gives rise to restrictive effects on the movement of encrypted
services in the Internal Market, since their distribution in countries without legal
protection against illicit reception is made more difficult.
However, this restrictive effect is not contrary to Community law because, as has been
recognized by the Court,39  in the absence of any Community harmonisation,
Member State are free to regulate economic activities in their territory in line with the
principles of the Treaty.  They may therefore decide, whilst respecting the
proportionality criterion, whether or not to prohibit certain activities on the grounds of
general interest objectives.
In conclusion, regulatory policy considerations relating to economic activities, which
are for the Member State to assess, may justify the restrictive effect entailed by the
regulatory void in the absence of any Community harmonisation.
4. Distortions of competition
Disparities between national regulations or the absence of such regulations in some
Member States may also lead to distortions of competition in the Internal Market.  An
operator who distributes his decoding devices in a State with strong legal protection
will have competitive advantages (which will for example be reflected in his
programme purchasing capacity) over the operator who has to distribute his service in
a State without effective legal protection, since the latter will have to bear additional
costs resulting for example from the choice of a particularly secure distribution
system.
This disparity between the competitive environments of the Member States could have
adverse consequences for the development of encrypted services in the Internal
Market, since operators would not be subject to the same market conditions within the
European Union.
In conclusion, disparity between regulations may lead to distortions of competition
which might make it more difficult to develop encrypted services.
Q 2:  The Commission would like to know the opinion of the parties concerned on
the existence of restrictions and restrictive effects other than those identified above.
                    
39 Case 52/79 Procureur du Roi v Marc J. V. C. Debauve and Others [1980]  ECR 833.39
CHAPTER 5:  THE NEED FOR AND POTENTIAL TYPES OF COMMUNITY ACTION
The preceding analysis demonstrates that there are a number of obstacles to the
efficient operation of the Internal Market;  some of these obstacles may prove to be
incompatible with Community law and would have therefore to be removed. This
would apply to those obstacles caused  by the application of national legislation which
on the grounds of protecting encrypted services, make a distinction between the nature
(hertzian or by satellite) or the origin of the service.
Other obstacles could however be justified by general interest objectives such as the
protection of consumers, and intellectual and industrial property rights where they
respect the principle of proportionality. This applies to obstacles to the free movement
of decoding devices and other services linked to them flowing from the disparity in
national regulations relating to the manufacture and marketing of these decoding
devices.
Furthermore, from an economic point of view, consultations have shown that the
current differences between regulatory solutions together with the additional costs and
legal insecurities which they cause, are peceived by the market leaders as a major
impedement to the development of new encrypted services. Effective legal protection
against illicit reception is a fundamental factor in persuading an investor to develop an
encrypted service and to launch it in other Member States.
Consequently, in respect of this last type of obstacles, an action to establish an
equivalent level of protection amongst all the Member States could prove necessary to
eliminate the  obstacles identified and to complete the regulatory framework for the
European audiovisual sector established by the "Television without frontiers"
Directive (89/552/EC) and the "Cable and satellite"Directive (93/83/EC) .
In this respect it should be emphasised that insofar as the objective sought is the
removal of obstacles to the efficient operation of the Internal Market caused by
disparities between national regulations for the legal protection of encrypted services,
such an objective may be attained solely through Community harmonisation.  Indeed,
it seems implausible that the Member States would spontaneously carry out a
rapprochement of national regulations which concern the legal protection of encrypted
services. However, should the case arise, the fact that it would not be within the
institutional framework of the Community legal order would render it ineffective and
fail to grant the industry the necessary legal security for the development of encrypted
services.
However, before deciding in favour of a regulatory initiative, the Commission would
like to know the opinion of the parties concerned on the initiatives which appear
below.
1. Aim of the action
The general objective of the measure would be to enable media professionals, whether
encrypted service providers, suppliers of programmes or manufacturers of devices, to
benefit in full from the opportunities offered by the Internal Market.  Indeed, in the
perspective of the Information Society, there is a risk that the full potential of these40
opportunities will not be realised if these companies do not enjoy sufficient legal
protection within the Union.
A clear regulatory framework, which would secure, throughout the Community, legal
protection against illicit reception of the service and would thus ensure the free
movement of services and of goods is a necessary precondition for the development of
the new services.
Moreover, considering the global nature of the problem of illicit reception, work
should be launched on an international level, especially within the framework of
bilateral agreements and the work of the WTO, in order to establish effective and
efficent rules on a worldwide scale. Indeed, an initiative to establish a regulatory
framework within the Internal Market would be incomplete if it did not include an
external dimension aimed at resolving the problem on an international level and
providing protection against imports from third countries.
2. Consistency with other Community policies
A regulatory initiative to ensure the legal protection of encrypted services would also
be consistent with other Community objectives and policies.
- A regulatory framework providing a high level of legal protection at Union
level would help to develop the European encrypted services and decoding
equipment manufacturing industries.  Without effective legal protection,
illicit reception and the resulting loss of revenue could undermine the
financial stability of encrypted service providers and make it more difficult
to develop such services.  Similar consequences would affect the decoding
equipment manufacturing industry which, in the absence of legal
protection, would not embark on an activity that was not protected against
fraudulent actions.
- A regulatory intervention to ensure the efficient operation of the Internal
Market would be coherent with the objectives pursued by the audivisual
and cultural policy of the Union.  Such a measure would ensure that
greater advantage was taken of intellectual property rights for programmes
broadcast by TV channels, which would lead to increased operating
resources for audiovisual production.  Indeed, the new encrypted services
are important for the development and circulation of artistic creation, as
well as for the growth of the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity;
however, the right holders will be reluctant to assign their rights if
encrypted services are not protected from illicit reception.  If this means
that encrypted services are deprived of programmes, they will be unable to
develop, and audiovisual creation will have lost the opportunity of
benefiting from a powerful broadcasting medium.
- A regulatory intervention to ensure the operation of the Internal Market
would be consistent with the objective of consumer protection.  In the
absence of a secure regulatory framework, consumers could be mislead
about the origin of the decoding device they are purchasing and thus
believe they are buying authorised equipment, whereas it is in fact a41
pirated decoder.  In this case, if the operator modifies the encryption
system for security reasons, the device purchased will be of no use to the
consumer, who will have to pay for another decoder.  Moreover,
unauthorised devices will not always be guaranteed by the pirate
manufacturers:  should the device breakdown, the consumer will have to
bear the cost of repairs.  In both cases, there are clear disadvantages for the
consumer from the marketing of unauthorised decoding devices.  In
addition, the losses suffered by the service providers have a negative effect
on their financial stability; consequently, the development of encrypted
services could be delayed by the lack of protection and this situation would
represent a loss for the consumer, who would be unable to benefit from the
service.
3. Choice of instrument and legal basis
In view of the analysis carried out, following consultation with the interested parties,
the Commission could decide to adopt one of the following two measures.
The Commission could propose a directive to harmonise national legislations (Option
1). In this respect, whilst taking account of the principles of proportionality and
subsidiarity, the proposed Directive could provide for minimal harmonisation leaving
the Member States free to adopt stricter measures, which would ensure a minimal level
of equivalent protection within the Union. This option would have the advantage of
securing legal protection for the sector concerned whilst leaving the Member States
some flexibility to widen the scope of this protection.
The Commission could, alternatively, propose a Council regulation (Option 2). This
option would have the same objective as the option above and the advantage of
securing a more effective harmonisation as it would be directly applicable in the
Member States without being implemented by national law.
Moreover the chosen option could be accompanied by a proposal to modify the
existing Community law provisions in respect of the free circulation of counterfeit
goods originating from third countries40 , so that the measures could apply with equal
force to decoding devices. It should nevertheless be noted that this measure alone is
inadequate to ensure effective legal protection within the Union. In effect, the
regulatory measures applicable to counterfeit goods are based on a voluntary
agreement by operators and interested parties, and apply solely to goods orginating
from third countries when they are imported into the Union. Trade between Member
States is regulated by national and Community regulations. However, there is no real
uniformity between national regulatory approaches to the manufacture and marketing
of illicit decoding devices ; this results in divergences between possible solutions and
in some cases there is a lack of protection. It therefore follows that an intervention to
control imports from third countries should accompany any regulatory proposal to
ensure protection against illicit reception within the Union.
                    
40 Council Regulation (EC) N° 3295/94 of the Council (O.J.E.C L 341 of 30.12.1994) laying down
measures to prohibit the release for free circulation, the export, re-export or entry for a suspensive
procedure of counterfeit and pirated goods.42
The appropriate legal basis would be Articles 57(2), 66 and 100a, taking into account
the objective of ensuring the efficient operation of the Internal Market and of enabling
the free movement of services and goods.41
4. Scope of application
The harmonisation envisaged would cover the current national regulations in the field
of the legal protection of encrypted services.  These regulations, where present, may
be found in copyright law, broadcasting law, civil law or administrative law.
Consequently their location in national law is unimportant;  what counts is their
objective, i.e. the protection of encrypted services against illicit access.
Such harmonisation could cover all encrypted services, for which encryption is used
to ensure the payment of a fee, without being restricted to broadcasting services.  This
category would therefore include the traditional encrypted broadcasting services
(cable, hertzian or satellite), the new broadcasting services (digital television,
pay-per-view, near video on demand) and Information Society services, namely
services provided electronically at a distance on the individual demand of a service
receiver (video on demand, supply of games on demand, interactive teleshopping).
Indeed, where a service is encrypted to limit its reception, it will need the same
protection independent of the type of service concerned (broadcasting, on individual
demand etc.).  On the other hand, if harmonisation were confined to broadcasting
services alone, it  would not be possible to cover the new uses of encryption such as
data transmission on individual demand or without images (e.g. a newspaper sent to a
home via satellite), as well as video games delivered directly to a home, by satellite or
cable.
Consequently, all encrypted services, for which decoding devices are available to the
public, should be able to enjoy the same protection.  Looking ahead to the
convergence of broadcasting and information technology services, the definition of
"encrypted services" should cover any service which can be received by a television or
computer screen, i.e. radio or television broadcasting services, as well as the other
interactive Information Society services, which are defined in the proposal for a
Directive on regulatory transparency in the Internal Market, namely distance services
transmitted electronically on the demand of the service receiver.
However, harmonisation should not cover the services which use encryption for
reasons other than that of ensuring payment of a fee, such as services which are
encrypted to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the message transmitted,
namely financial or telecommunications services.  The reason for this exclusion is that
the general interest objectives put at risk if they are intercepted, i.e. the integrity and
confidentiality of the communication, differ significantly from the protection of the
value of a service provided in exchange for a fee, which is the general interest
objective threatened by illicit reception.  This difference has led to regulatory
solutions which differ significantly, both at national and international level, in
                    
41   In the event that the counterfeit goods Regulation were to be amended, the legal basis would
remain unchanged, i.e. Article 113.43
particular as regards the action to be taken and the level of sanctions, and which do not
justify joint treatment of the two problems.
Protection against goods from third countries should cover all decoding devices
imported from a third country which enable reception of an encrypted service without
the prior authorisation of the encryptor.
5. Overall structure
In view of the proportionality principle, the proposed provisions could prohibit the
following activities:
the manufacture of decoding devices intended to permit access to encrypted
services without the authorisation of the encryptor;
the sale of decoding devices intended to permit access to encrypted services
without the authorisation of the encryptor;
the possession for commercial purposes of decoding devices intended to permit
access to encrypted services without the authorisation of the encryptor;
the possession for private purposes of decoding devices intended to permit
access to encrypted services without the authorisation of the encryptor;
the installation, maintenance and replacement of decoding devices intended to
permit access to encrypted services without the authorisation of the encryptor;
the marketing of decoding devices intended to permit access to encrypted
services without the authorisation of the encryptor;
the decoding of encrypted broadcasts without the authorisation of the
encryptor.
The proposed measure should also provide that Member States adopt effective,
proportionate and deterrent penalties for the breach of these provisions.  In this
respect, as the Commission has stated in its communication on the role of penalties in
implementing Community legislation,42  the Member States would remain free to
determine the structure for these sanctions.  The measure could therefore provide for a
procedure whereby the Commission is notified of provisions which Member States
intend to adopt.
It should also enable any interested party to bring a claim for damages and interest.
As regards provisions on protection against the release into circulation of goods from
third countries, the proposed measure should prohibit the importation of decoding
                    
42 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the role of
penalties in implementing Community Internal Market legislation COM(95) 162 final of
3 May 1995.44
devices intended to permit access to encrypted services without the authorisation of
the encryptor.
Q 3: The Commission would like to know the opinion of the parties concerned on
the need for harmonisation at Community level.
Q 4: The Commission would like to know the opinion of the parties concerned on
the form of a possible harmonisation instrument from the options presented in the
Green Paper.
Q 5: The Commission would like to know the opinion of the parties concerned on
the content of a possible harmonisation instrument, as envisaged above, in
particular:
i. the scope
a. should this be limited to broadcasting services or extended to all services in
which encryption is used to ensure payment of the subscription fee;
b. if the scope were to be extended, would the criterion used be appropriate
(services encrypted to ensure payment of the subscription fee), or should another
criterion be used to determine the scope ?  If so, would it be considered
necessary for the harmonisation instrument to protect all services against illicit
reception which use conditional access techniques, including for example
passwords (whether they are encrypted or not)?
ii. the desirability of including the possession by private individuals of
unauthorised decoding devices;
iii. claims for damages and interest.45
LIST OF QUESTIONS
Q 1: The Commission would like to have any additional information to enable it
to examine national regulations in greater detail.
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the content of a possible harmonisation instrument, as envisaged above, in
particular:
i. the scope
a. should this be limited to broadcasting services or extended to all services in
which encryption is used to ensure payment of the subscription fee;
b. if the scope were to be extended, would the criterion used be appropriate
(services encrypted to ensure payment of the subscription fee), or should another
criterion be used to determine the scope ?  If so, would it be considered
necessary for the harmonisation instrument to protect all services against illicit
reception which use conditional access techniques, including for example
passwords (whether they are encrypted or not)?
ii. the desirability of including the possession by private individuals of
unauthorised decoding devices;
iii. claims for damages and interest.